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Eight Years with the Accounting Principles Board

HOW IT FEELS TO BE A GORED OX
By DONALD J. BEVIS / Retired Partner
Risks and Rewards
" M y greatest experience in 40 years of public accounting/' says Donald Bevis,
"was my tenure on the APB, from 1965 until the Board's demise in 1973,
when it was succeeded by the Financial Accounting Standards Board."
As a measure of his experience, he cites the number of Board
pronouncements during that eight-year period:
• 26 Opinions (Nos. 6 through 31) and approximately 200 Accounting
Interpretations of these Opinions;
• 3 Statements;
• 7 Accounting Research Studies;
• 19 Industry Audit and Accounting Guides. (The stated accounting principles and practices of these guides required the approval of the APB.)
" D u r i n g that p e r i o d / ' he says, " I conversed w i t h the most knowledgeable
and capable accountants in the profession—in practice, industry, government,
and the academe. These discussions, plus others with people in the
financial community, greatly influenced my decisions on accounting issues.
An initial conclusion was not necessarily the final one. I also learned to
appreciate that there is more than one informed opinion on any accounting
principle or its application.
"Considering the fact that APB work was voluntary," he says, " i t was
amazing to note the amount of time spent. For many members, including
myself, it became almost a full-time duty: board meetings, committee
meetings, night sessions, reams of correspondence, public hearings, draft
pronouncements, and other activities. To this must be added the volunteered
time of observers and advisers to Board members and those working on
Industry Audit and Accounting Guides and Board-authorized research studies.
In addition, one cannot overlook the time freely given by personnel
of the SEC and other government bodies, together w i t h the efforts of
industry and accounting organizations, in developing information and
commentary on proposed pronouncements. Finally, invaluable service was
rendered by the AICPA staff. I w o u l d estimate that in the last several
years, when the output was greatest, the annual cost was close to $2.5 million.
This compares to a proposed annual cost of $3.5 million for the FASB."
All of the material accumulated by the Board concerning its unfinished
business has been made available to the FASB. These include Industry
Audit and Accounting Guides and Accounting Research Studies in process.
Some of the unfinished APB items are on the first priority list of FASB.

Criticisms of the Board
It is often said that the Accounting
Principles Board did not deal w i t h
fundamental issues but spent too
much time " p u t t i n g out fires." I believe, however, that a rereading of
the Opinions and Statements will
demonstrate that the APB did deal
w i t h many fundamental issues on ac-

counting principles and financial reporting.*
Furthermore, because of the rapidly changing business and economic
environment, it was necessary to put
out fires, ignited in some cases by
* G o o d examples are the Opinions on Accounting for
Income Taxes, Reporting the Results of Operations,
and The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments
in Common Stock.

45

HOW IT FEELS TO BE A GORED OX

avant garde methods of " f r o n t loading"—although a few flared up beyond the capacity of the fire department to handle in a satisfactory manner. The delay or failure in putting
out some fires arose either from the
need to obtain the required background information and reconcile
different points of view before a
sound pronouncement could be issued, or because other items had a
higher priority on the agenda. Even
FASB, however, a completely fulltime organization dealing w i t h f u n damental issues on a more timely
basis, will still have to put out fires.
Another complaint was that the
Board did not deal directly w i t h the
objectives of financial statements
and financial reporting. It was contended the Board should have resolved this pervasive subject early in
its history, in order that attempts at
codification of proper accounting
p r i n c i p l e s w o u l d be p r o d u c t i v e .
There is considerable validity to this
criticism, but volunteer bodies cannot always resolve issues as soon as
the critics w o u l d like. FASB has the
matter high on its agenda, and has
released a discussion memorandum
embodying the Trueblood Committee Report on "Objectives of Financial Statements." But w e should not
expect overnight implementation;
after all, it took the Objectives Study
Group two years to prepare its report
issued in 1973.
The Board lacked independence,
according to some critics. It was suggested that the individual members,
and hence the Board itself, lacked
independence because the members
were subjected to pressures from
clients of their firms. This was far
from the truth. Each firm had clients
w h o took opposite positions on many
issues. Board members openly disagreed w i t h other partners in their
46

firms. Quite often the individual
firms could not reach a unanimous
p o s i t i o n on c o n t r o v e r s i a l issues.
Compromises were necessary. In my
opinion, Board members sat d o w n
with objectivity and attempted to resolve all issues on their merits. Even
though the Board acted w i t h independence, it may have lacked the appearance of independence, so critical in obtaining public acceptance of
its pronouncements.
Pressures that did hurt the accomplishments of the Board arose
from industry critics, letter-writing
campaigns to Congressmen initiated
by industry, lack of support at critical
times by the SEC, and, in some cases,
lack of support from fellow members
of the practicing profession (e.g., a
proposed amendment in 1969 to the
Code of Professional Conduct, requiring disclosure of departures from
APB Opinions, narrowly failed to
receive the necessary two-thirds affirmative votes). FASB, of course,
can't be criticized for lack of independence because its members are
occupied full-time w i t h their activities and have disassociated themselves from their former firms or employers. It remains to be seen what
adverse actions may come from letter-writing campaigns to Congress or
from the SEC.
In recent months the SEC has emphasized a distinction between acc o u n t i n g disclosure ( " t h e i r p r o v ince") and accounting measurement
(FASB responsibility). The distinction
appears to be artificial and must be
resolved if FASB is to accomplish its
goals, and if the establishment of accounting principles is to remain in
the private sector. In this connection,
it should be noted that on December
20, 1973, in Accounting Series Release No. 150, the Commission reaffirmed its long standing policy " o f

looking to the private sector for leadership in establishing and improving
accounting principles and standards
through the FASB, w i t h the expectation that the body's conclusions w i l l
promote the interests of investors."
The Board allegedly did not give
adequate representation to issuers
and users of financial statements in
the determination of accounting
principles; as an arm of the AICPA,
it appeared to be both legislative and
executive. Here again, there is some
justification for this complaint. In the
new FASB, however, both the requirements for membership and the
operating procedures provide for
greater participation and input by
issuers and users. But FASB must
demonstrate that it can develop and
maintain the legislative " c l o u t " and
prestige that will be so necessary to
avoid power conflicts between the
interested groups. The APB lacked
the prestige to minimize these conflicts.
The APB did not always have adequate research to support its conclusions, critics said. This was true in
some cases, but if the Board had
waited because of the political significance of some issues, it might
well have resulted in "locking the
barn after the horse was stolen." In
the minds of many, issuance of the
most-criticized Opinions did stop
many of the abuses. In partial defense of the APB, it should be noted
that the discussions w i t h industry and
other organizations, public hearings,
and the formal exposure process did
not always elicit all the problem
areas that had arisen or w o u l d arise
if the proposed Opinion were to be
issued. Responsibility for this arose
through failure of some respondents
to give adequate consideration to all
sides of the subject matter. More
often than not, on controversial is-

sues the name of the game was destructive criticism—not constructive
criticism. Research was delayed in
some cases because the time of the
AICPA research staff was used to
draft and revise proposed Opinions
and Statements.
There were t w o complaints which
were completely opposite. Some
contended that the Opinions dealt
primarily w i t h principles and did not
state how they should be implemented. Others contended that the
Opinions were " c o o k b o o k s " ; they
should have been limited to principles, leaving the application up to
the judgment of issuers of financial
statements and their auditors. While
some change in format might have
been made, the Board believed that
in highly technical and controversial
issues it was necessary to go into
considerable detail to avoid misapplication of its conclusions. In other
cases where the conclusions were
quite clear, the Board did not believe
it was necessary to prescribe the
bookkeeping.
Finally, the critics say the Board,
which included the author of this article, accepted too many compromise positions. In a democracy, you
must reconcile different points of
view if progress is to be achieved.
Politics also has a role in establishing
accounting principles. Some progress
is always better than none. Apropos
of t h i s c o m p l a i n t , s o m e c r i t i c s
said, if Opinions of the APB were
compromises, w h y did some members qualify their assent or dissent. It
must be remembered that the adopt i o n of O p i n i o n s r e q u i r e d a t w o thirds favorable vote on the issues.
The APB did not operate in an atmosphere of dissent. But even w i t h compromises, some members still qualified their assents or dissents because
they could not agree on all parts of

the solution that had been reached.
Strengths of the Board
The strengths of the Board have been
mentioned above. In summary, they
were:
7. Accounting expertise. Members
of the Board were some of the most
knowledgeable and capable accountants in the country. All had direct
contacts w i t h many other experts on
specific issues.
2. Dedication. Although service on
the APB was voluntary, its members
were dedicated to the determination
of sound accounting principles. Availability of time was not a major limiting factor.
3. Integrity. Board members maint a i n e d t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e at all
times. They only changed their conclusions when the weight of evidence
and support was against them.
4. Objectivity. Board members approached all issues on the basis of
their merits. They were not influenced by unsupported special interests and so-called "popularity contests." Compromises were necessary
to reconcile strong opposing points
of view.
Weaknesses of the Board
For equal time, I will summarize the
weaknesses of the Board. They were:
1. It was not a full-time body and
lacked the time and resources to resolve some important issues.
2. It did not establish the objectives of f i n a n c i a l statements and
financial reporting.
3. The input from issuers and users
of financial statements was inadequate in some cases.
4. Research, both basic and applied, was lacking in some cases.
The Beginning of the End
By 1969, the Board had gained con-

siderable public respect and stature,
although it had not accomplished as
much as some people expected. (It
was established in September 1959,
when it assumed the responsibilities
of t h e f o r m e r c o m m i t t e e s on accounting procedure and on terminology.) It had overcome the criticisms growing out of the "investment
credit" fiasco, a situation that almost
resulted in the death of the APB—
which is perhaps worth going into
here.
In December 1962, the APB issued
its Opinion No. 2, Accounting for
the "Investment Credit," concluding
"that the allowable investment credit
should be reflected in net income
over the productive life of acquired
property and not in the year in which
it is placed in service." Some accountants and businessmen refused
to abide by the O p i n i o n , and the SEC
backed down in 1963 from its initial
support, w i t h the result that the APB
was forced to amend the O p i n i o n .
Opinion No. 4 (March 1964) permits
treating the credit as a reduction of
federal income taxes of the year in
which the credit arises, or spreading
it over the productive life of the related property.
In mid-1967, in the exposure draft
of Opinion No. 1 1 , Accounting for
Income Taxes, the APB again tried to
establish that there was only one way
to account for investment tax credits
—they should be reflected in income
over the life of the related assets.
Again, some accountants and businessmen and the SEC refused to support the conclusion, and the subject
was dropped from the O p i n i o n .
In 1969 the Board began a re-examination of Accounting Research
Bulletin No. 48, Business Combinations (issued in January 1957). The
application of this bulletin, w i t h the
acquiescence of the SEC, became so
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watered down that there was no logical standard for accounting for business c o m b i n a t i o n s . C l a m o r arose
from all sides for its revision and the
stopping of abuses practiced under
the guise of generally accepted accounting principles.
The APB's initial position w o u l d
have barred pooling-of-interests accounting. Intense pressures on the
Board were exerted by the profession and by industry in this highly
emotional and controversial issue.
The Board foundered. It backed away
step-by-step from what many considered to be the most important crit e r i o n , if p o o l i n g - o f - i n t e r e s t s accounting was to be permitted (from
a 3 to 1 size test, to a 9 to 1 size test,
and then to no size test). But something had been done; a weak O p i n ion (but not as weak as the one before) was issued in A u g u s t 1970
(Opinion No. 16—Business Combinations). There was, however, general
dissatisfaction w i t h the result. The
" q u a l i t y of e a r n i n g s " of a postmerger company was still suspect.
From this point forward there was a
d i s t i n c t loss of c o n f i d e n c e in the
Board. It had yielded to pressures.
Shortly thereafter, the American
Accounting Association, the academics' organization, appointed a committee to look into the establishment
of generally accepted a c c o u n t i n g
principles. That committee discontinued its activities when the AICPA,
early in 1971, appointed two committees—the Study Group on Establishment of Accounting Principles
and the Study Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements.
The same year, 1971, also saw several other events and debacles which
had a deleterious impact on the effectiveness and activities of the APB.
Congress, at the request of some
businessmen and professional ac48

countants, and despite strong support of the APB position (the same as
in 1967) by the SEC, specified in law
how to account for the investment
credit. The options permitted under
Opinion No. 4 were continued.
In 1968, the Board had begun an
intensive study on a c c o u n t i n g for
marketable securities. By 1971, it was
prepared to issue an exposure draft
which w o u l d have required carrying
such securities in the balance sheet
at current market values and reflecting the unrealized gains or losses in
current income. The insurance industry objected. Other proposals were
suggested b u t there w e r e always
strong objections from influential
sources. The SEC did not support the
APB; the matter died.
Other blows to the Board soon f o l lowed. For several years it had been
considering accounting in the extractive industries. However, the Federal
Power Commission issued a regulation requiring " f u l l cost" accounting
by natural gas pipeline companies.
This occurred despite a request from
the Board to hold up any regulation
until the Board had completed its
study.
Accounting for leases was also high
on the agenda of the APB. Preliminary discussions had been held w i t h
interested parties but no conclusions
had been reached. However, in an attempt to forestall any requirements
for capitalization of leases, lobbying
in Congress began. It was contended
that any such requirement w o u l d seriously disrupt a major factor in the
economy of the country. Resolution
o f t h e issue by t h e B o a r d w a s
dropped.
By the end of 1971, the ; demise of
the Board was clearly predictable.
The Board had not been able to cope
with the environment in which it o p erated. Public trust had not been es-

tablished. The ox had been gored.
What Did the APB Accomplish?
The Board believed that financial accounting could be made a rational
discipline, but it was faced w i t h both
intellectual and political problems.
Despite these problems, the Board
did make considerable progress in
improving financial reporting:
1. Financial a c c o u n t i n g , it said,
should recognize the economic substance of events or transactions, even
though the legal form differs.
2. Improved disclosures in reporting were required.
3. Areas of difference in accounting and reporting were narrowed.
4. Recognition of "current value"
accounting in contrast to historical
cost accounting received increasing
attention.
5. "Front loading" of income was
severely restricted.
Good Opinions
The Opinions briefly discussed below provide some evidence of the
accomplishments of the APB.
No. 8—Accounting for the Cost of
Pension Plans (November 1966). This
O p i n i o n states that the establishment
of a pension plan implies a long-term
undertaking, and that, accordingly,
pension costs should be recognized
annually, even though there may be
legal limitations. The Opinion needs
updating in view of experiences in
the past eight years, new developments in pension plans, and recently
enacted legislation.
No. 9 — Reporting the Results of
Operations
(December 1966). This
Opinion established that the "all-inclusive" concept should be followed
in income reporting, rather than the
"current operating performance"
concept. Direct entries of profit and
loss items to retained earnings were
ruled out.

No. 11 — Accounting
for Income
Taxes (December 7967).This O p i n i o n
required comprehensive interperiod
tax allocation in the determination of
income tax expense, even though
there was no legal liability at the
time. In my o p i n i o n , the question of
the use of the "deferred m e t h o d / '
instead of the " l i a b i l i t y m e t h o d , "
should now be reconsidered. Further,
the accounting for income taxes in
special areas (see APB O p i n i o n No.
23) needs re-examination. There can
be only one proper method of accounting for incentive tax credits and
that matter should also be covered
in any revision.
No. 18—The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common
Stock (March 1971). This Opinion requires the application of the equity
method of accounting for certain investments in c o m m o n stock that are
50 percent or less of the voting power
— in order to give some recognition
to their changing value.
No. 19—Reporting Changes in Financial Position (March 1971). This
O p i n i o n requires the inclusion of a
statement of changes in financial position as a basic financial statement.
No. 20—Accounting Changes (July
1971). This Opinion eliminated the
areas of difference in reporting accounting changes.
No. 21 — Interest on Receivables
and Payables (August 1971). This
Opinion requires the imputation of
interest when the face amount of the
o b l i g a t i o n does not represent the
present value of the consideration
given or received in the exchange.
No. 22 —Disclosure of Accounting
Policies (April 1972). As the title indicates, this Opinion requires the disclosure of all significant accounting
policies.
No. 28—Interim Financial Reporting (May 1973). This O p i n i o n extends

the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of generally accepted accounting principles to interim financial reporting.
No. 29—Accounting for Non-monetary Transactions (May 1973). This
Opinion narrowed the areas of difference in accounting for such transactions.
No. 30—Reporting the Results of
Operations (June 1973). This O p i n i o n
eliminated areas of difference, and established more definitive disclosure
requirements in reporting on certain
events and transactions. The O p i n i o n
was also needed to stop the rapidly
d e v e l o p i n g p r a c t i c e of r e c o r d i n g
debits to income from unusual transactions as extraordinary items, and
credits to income from such transactions as ordinary items.
Poor Opinions
No. 4—Accounting for the /ylnvestment Credit'—amending
APB Opinion No. 2 (March 1964). N o t h i n g
further need be said about Opinion
No. 4. The events surrounding it almost disrupted any progress in accounting.
No. 5—Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements of Lessee (September 1964). The Opinion provided
that leases should be capitalized if
the terms of the lease resulted " i n the
creation of a material equity in the
property." However, the definition
of creation of a material equity was
inconclusive and little good came
from the O p i n i o n .
No. 14—Accounting for Convertible Debt and Debt Issued with Stock
Purchase Warrants (March 1969). In
APB Opinion No. 10, the Board stated
w i t h considerable logic that the portion of the proceeds attributable to
the conversion feature of convertible debt should be accounted for as
paid-in capital. This action was reversed in No. 14 because of the " p u r -

p o r t e d " inseparability of the debt
and the conversion o p t i o n , and because of the difficulties of implementation. The conclusion led to other
nonsequiturs, like the requirement
in No. 26, Early Extinguishment of
Debt, that any gain or loss on the ext i n g u i s h m e n t of c o n v e r t i b l e d e b t
should be recognized in income and
cannot be an adjustment of capital.
No. 16—Business
Combinations
(August 1970). The history and results
of issuance of this O p i n i o n have already been referred to.
Other Opinions
One other Opinion deserves some
comment. No. 15—Earnings PerShare
(May 1969). This has been criticized
because of its internal complexity
and arbitrary rules. Further, over 100
interpretations of the O p i n i o n were
subsequently issued. Nevertheless, in
v i e w of the business e n v i r o n m e n t
and the emphasis on earnings per
share at the time, it was essential that
the Board take some stand on the
subject. Uniformity in practice had
to be established.
Conclusion
Obviously, I hope the FASB will learn
from the experience of the APB. The
APB started w i t h great expectations.
The FASB will need the support of all
interested parties if it is to succeed.
Bitter and acrimonious debate must
yield to objectivity and constructive
cooperation. The espousal of personal interests must be secondary.
On a personal note, the benefits of
eight years w i t h the Accounting Principles Board cannot be evaluated.
There is no way to assign a dollar
value to the education I received, to
the many new friendships created,
and more importantly to the contributions of many to the development
of sound accounting practices. The
Board rests—in peace.
&

